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EXPLAINING ‘IRRATIONALITIES’ OF IT-ENABLED CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY BUREAUCRACY: THE CASE OF GHANA’S TRADENET  
 
Atta A Addo 
London School of Economics, UK 
a.a.addo@lse.ac.uk 
 
ABSTRACT 
Through a case study of Ghana’s TradeNet, a business-to-government (B2G) Electronic Data 
Interchange (EDI) implemented to automate and integrate customs clearance, this article inves-
tigates ‘irrationalities’ of IT-enabled change in the context of a developing country bureaucracy. 
Our data revealed that despite TradeNet’s potential for full automation and integration, bureau-
crats sometimes preferred manual, face-to-face, paper-based practices. We explain such out-
come—often depicted in the literature as a kind of ‘irrationality’—by drawing upon the theo-
retical notion of institutional logics to trace underlying logics of TradeNet-enabled change. We 
investigate two specific TradeNet-enabled practices—Import Declaration Form (IDF) pro-
cessing and risk controls—and show that where ‘irrationality’ was present (IDF processing), 
the managerial logic of TradeNet contradicted existing bureaucratic logics. We therefore inter-
pret ‘irrationality’ as ‘good enough’ or satisficing when new logics of IT and old bureaucratic 
logics contradicted. Our findings move beyond success or failure interpretations typical in In-
formation Systems in developing countries (ISDC) and ICT for development (ICT4D) research. 
We also enhance knowledge of IT-enabled change in developing country bureaucracies by 
moving beyond the organizational milieu to emphasize broader institutional forces in develop-
ing countries such as neopatrimonialism. Such theorization advances ISDC/ICT4D research 
where reconciling micro with macro accounts remains daunting. 
 
Keywords: institutional logics; neopatrimonialism; rent seeking; managerialism; bureaucratic 
reform; IS in developing countries; trade facilitation; TradeNet; ICT4D 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Information technology has long been deployed in developing countries as a means of modern-
izing bureaucracies by rationalizing their practices—that is, by making them more efficient and 
effective. Developing countries, however, have been notably problematic environments for in-
formation technologies (Heeks, 2002b; Danish, 2006; Walsham and Sahay, 2006; Avgerou, 
2008). For example, Heeks (2003) reported that most IT implementations in the public sector 
in Developing Countries fail, with 35% being total failures (IT not implemented or implemented 
but abandoned), and 50% partial failures (core objectives were not achieved or the outcomes 
undesirable).  
On the problems of IT in developing countries, a common narrative in ISDC and ICT4D 
research is that IT users in developing countries tend to have peculiar practices or behaviors 
that go against IT’s rationality assumptions (Avgerou, 2000). Avgerou (2000, p. 2) poignantly 
observes about developing countries that “the techno-economic rationality of western moder-
nity is instrumental in defining a series of problems and determining their solutions [but] is 
blatantly unsuccessful in streamlining people’s behavior to the achievement of such solutions.” 
Such peculiar behaviors and practices of IT users in developing countries that IT is ‘unsuccess-
ful in streamlining’ have been poorly understood and thus, presented as ‘irrationalities’, from 
the perspective of rationalization goals of IT (Avgerou, 2000).  
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To explain such ‘irrationalities’, scholars have focused on technology or social aspects 
of use. Design of IT, for example, has been suggested to contradict ‘actuality’ of developing 
countries thereby creating a ‘design-actuality gap’ (Heeks, 2002a, 2005). Avgerou and Land 
(1992, p. 38), similarly questioned the “appropriateness” of IT in developing countries where 
“rigid norms and structures” of “traditional societies” contradict fundamental tenets of IT’s 
socio-technical design such as ‘user participation’. Social accounts have pointed to micro (in-
dividual) level factors such as user resistance (Cavalheiro and Joia, 2013), incongruent alterna-
tive rationalities (Avgerou, 2000, 2002), conflicting multiple rationalities (Chilundo and 
Aanestad, 2004), lack of skills and competencies (Corea, 2007; Zaied, Khairalla and Al-Rashed, 
2007), micro politics and vested interests (Peterson, 1998); or macro (group) level factors such 
as culture (Hill et al., 1998; Zhao and Khan, 2013) and institutions (McGrath and Maiye, 2010).  
 
1.2 Research Problem 
Notwithstanding insights provided by extant approaches, some theoretical challenges exist. One 
is how to reconcile accounts of ‘irrationalities’ at the individual level with institutional factors 
at the social level while escaping the determinism trap (see e.g., Leonardi and Barley, 2008). 
For example, purely structural accounts of IT related phenomena might be accused of down-
playing agency, that is, cognitive capacity of actors for planned or situated action (see e.g., 
Volkoff, Strong and Elmes, 2007); whereas, purely agent-based accounts might be accused of 
ignoring macro structural fields within which actors are embedded, and which they draw upon 
for action (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Giddens, 1984). A second challenge is to elaborate 
how IT itself is implicated in observed ‘irrationalities’ of bureaucratic rationalization in devel-
oping countries, in light of admonition by scholars of institutions that “[existing] institutional-
ized practices are rarely ever completely extinguished but continue albeit weaker in scope (ex-
tent of diffusion) or potency” (Dacin and Dacin, 2008, p. 327). 
 
1.3 Objectives 
In this article, we pursue a different line of explanation that tries to overcome the noted theo-
retical concerns. We argue that ‘irrationalities’ of IT-enabled bureaucratic rationalization in 
developing countries may be traced to underlying contradicting institutional logics. Further-
more, such ‘irrationalities’ during IT rationalization—rather than being interpreted in straight-
forward terms of failure—might be better understood as a ‘good enough’ or ‘satisficing’ out-
come (Simon, 1947, 1955) of contradicting old bureaucratic institutional logics and new man-
agerial rationalism of IT. Unlike micro approaches that emphasize agency and cognition to the 
neglect of broader social structures, or macro approaches that do the obverse, institutional logics 
integrates agency and cognition with broader socially constructed institutional patterns and rule 
structures (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 101). Furthermore, by tracing contradictions between 
institutional logics of bureaucracy and that of IT, our approach emphasizes interaction between 
the social and technical and tries to overcome social or technological determinism. 
Our theorizing is instantiated with a case study of Ghana’s TradeNet-enabled rationali-
zation, principally involving Ghana Customs Division (GCD) and other public and private or-
ganizations such as TradeNet’s management company, Ghana Community Network (GCNET), 
destination inspection companies (DICs) and Government of Ghana (GoG) regulatory agencies. 
Primary data for this article was collected over several months as part of doctoral fieldwork in 
Ghana. The main research site was GCD’s field office at Ghana’s largest port, Tema Harbour, 
a hub for key trade actors. The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section outlines 
theoretical framework of the research: institutional logics, managerial rationalism of IT and 
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neopatrimonial rent seeking logics of African bureaucracies. We then describe the research 
methodology followed by the case. We discuss findings and conclude with implications. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Institutional logics  
Friedland and Alford (1991) in their examination of the relation between society, organizations 
and individuals, considered institutions as patterns of activity beyond the organizational level 
that are rooted in symbolism and material practices. Such symbols and practices provide re-
sources for individuals, groups, or organizations to draw upon, elaborate or manipulate. Organ-
izations and individuals draw upon such symbolic and material resources to shape their actions 
and give their experiences meaning; and in the process, reproduce such institutions. Institutional 
logics are thus the organizing principles that underpin individual practices, consistent with a 
given institution (Friedland and Alford 1991). Aside providing organizing principles, institu-
tional logics also give motive and sense of self to social actors who in turn reproduce it through 
their action (Friedland and Alford, 1991, 232,248-252).  
Friedland and Alford (1991, 248-249) defined institutional logics as “a set of material 
practices and symbolic constructions which constitutes its organizing principles and which is 
available to organizations and individuals to elaborate.” Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p. 804) 
similarly defined institutional logics as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material 
practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.” 
In this way, institutional logics are consistent with the structurational view of new institutional 
theory with regard to the recursive interaction between structure and human action. For exam-
ple, Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 23) suggested that a structurational account such as that of 
Giddens (1984) “provides a cognitive theory of commitment to scripted behaviors” that help 
explain how institutions reify through action.  
By connecting individual agency and cognition with broader socially constructed insti-
tutional patterns and rule structures (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 101), institutional logics 
contrast with both rational choice theories that are narrowly individualistic and cognitivist and 
structural accounts that overlook situated agency. The institutional logic construct therefore, 
advances upon, and is distinguishable from new institutionalist accounts where institutions—
historically developed patterns of social actions and relations, which have acquired a taken-for-
granted meaning, value, and significance—are not subject to individual cognitive considera-
tions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Jepperson’s (1991, p. 143) definition of institution as “an 
organized, established, procedure” further stresses the structural, historical and taken-for-grant-
edness of institutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991, p. 23). As such, in contrast to the general 
institutional view that actors are passively subject to institutional scripts, institutional logic sug-
gests that actors act based on their own cognition but that cognition is consistent with goals and 
taken-for-granted assumptions that are situated within a particular institutional context—a no-
tion described as “embedded agency” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, 103-104).  
Through the notion of embedded agency, institutional logics stresses that humans are 
not nonrational recipients and performers of taken-for-granted institutional scripts but act upon 
rationality embedded in an institutional context. Humans therefore navigate institutional struc-
tures in accordance with particular logics. Institutional logics influence mindful, rational be-
havior of individual actors in an organization who in turn shape institutional logics (Thornton, 
2004). By providing a link between broader institutions and individual action, the institutional 
logics approach bridges macro, structural perspectives of institutional theorists like DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) and micro, processual approaches of others like Zucker (1977). Situated 
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action is further tied to beliefs and practices from wider institutional environments thereby 
overcoming critiques of diffusion and isomorphism studies such as Hasselbladh and Kallinikos’ 
(2000).  
Four aspects of institutional logics and their interplay are especially salient to this study. 
First, institutional logics provide organizing principles for action based on values and objectives 
of the institution (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008) . Second, they con-
tain assumptions about “means-ends relationships” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 112). Third, 
institutional logics enable identity formation for individuals and organizations (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Finally, institutional logics are domain specific and 
multiple institutional logics might exist within an organization (Friedland and Alford, 1991; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
 
2.2 Managerial Rationalism 
Managerial rationalism, among other things, stresses efficiency, effectiveness, control and ac-
countability—attributes typically associated with business. In developing countries, external 
coercive pressures toward organizational isomorphism have increasingly bore on states to be-
come more managerial than bureaucratic. Since the 1980s, when the public administration par-
adigm of New Public Management (NPM) began to take hold in many developed countries, 
mimetic, coercive and normative influences (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) from international 
development donors have mounted on developing countries to similarly emphasize managerial 
rationales such as efficiency, market mechanisms and transparent practices (Hood, 1995; 
McCourt, 2001; Minogue, 2001, p. 6; Sulle, 2010).  
Along such lines of donor-driven managerial rationalism, Minogue (2001, p.6) draws 
attention to the regime of ‘good governance’ being promoted by international development or-
ganizations, sometimes incorporating elements of public managerial reform (DFID, 1997; The 
WorldBank Group, 1994; UNDP, 1998). This approach of packaging good governance initia-
tives and conditionalities with requirements for public managerial reform is suggested as a rec-
ipe for more responsive public services and ultimately for development (see e.g., The World 
Bank Group, 1997).  
The uptake of such managerial rationalism in developing countries varies according to 
the particular element being considered. Some of the more common elements have been privat-
ization and downsizing of bureaucracies as a core part of structural adjustment programs cham-
pioned by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Polidano, 2001, p. 46). In 
addition, many developing countries have experimented with other aspects of managerial ra-
tionalism such as corporatization (converting civil service departments into free-standing agen-
cies within or outside the civil service) (Polidano, 2001, p. 47). Ghana and several other African 
countries, for example, have merged their customs and income tax departments into corporate-
like national revenue authorities to promote effectiveness of internal revenue mobilization 
(Polidano, 2001, p. 47). Various other examples of managerial rationalism have been promoted 
by international development donors in Ghana and other African countries’ bureaucracies (se 
ee.g. de Merode and Thomas, 1994; Dodoo, 1997; Christiansen, 1998; McCourt, 1998; 
Polidano, 1999). 
In the context of Ghana’s TradeNet implementation, managerial rationalism was pur-
sued through training of bureaucrats in new ways of performance and management as well as 
TradeNet-enabled rationalization of customs clearance practices by automation and integration. 
For example, as part of managerial rationalism championed by the World Bank and IMF in 
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Ghana, the GCD became an ISO 9000 certified organization (World Bank Group, 2010).1 Un-
surprisingly, we found during our research interviews that several customs officers and govern-
ment bureaucrats generally spoke in jargons consistent with logic of managerial rationalism 
such as “revenue targets”, “performance review”, “turnaround time”. “KPI (key performance 
indicator)” etc. As an artefact meant to enable rationalization of customs clearance processes, 
TradeNet was inscribed (Akrich, 1992; Heeks, 2005) with such managerial rationalism to ac-
complish rationalization objectives. 
 
2.3 Bureaucratic Logic of Neopatrimonial Rent Seeking 
Neopatrimonialism, an established concept in political science and political economy, has been 
widely applied to shed light on the nature of institutions in developing countries, particularly 
those in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Van de Walle, 
2001a). Clapham (1985, p. 48) defines it as “a form of organization in which relationships of a 
broadly patrimonial type pervade an administrative system which is formally constructed on 
rational-legal lines. Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which 
are formally defined, but exercise those powers [...] as a form [...] of private property”. Neopat-
rimonialism is therefore understood as a hybrid institutional arrangement that combines an ap-
parent formal, modern, rational-legal administrative apparatus (the “neo”), with a patrimonial 
system wherein elites control public offices for private gain (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). 
It is a co-existence of Weber’s 1922 (1978) two ideal types of patrimonial and rational-legal 
domination (Eisenstadt, 1973; Clapham, 1985, p. 48; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, p. 62). 
Social and political structures, as a result, differ fundamentally from the formalized modalities 
of official conduct in a rational-legal system (Erdmann and Engel, 2006). 
Van de Walle (2001b) has suggested that states vary in degree of neopatrimonialism 
from ideal types of completely patrimonial to completely rational-legal. Scholars like Bratton 
and van de Walle (1997), Chabal and Daloz (1999), show how in classic neopatrimonial states, 
institutional decision-making can be personalized by actors and their personal networks within 
and without the state structure. Such actors act upon a logic of personal, rather than national 
interest, and may exist at all levels from the top right down to the street-level bureaucracy. 
Cammack (2007, p. 600) notes that “policy decisions about development and governance are 
subordinated to that single, overriding [personal] goal.” In the African context, separation be-
tween the private and public realms—the basis of modern conceptions of the state and public 
administration—is said to be thin or non-existent (von Soest, 2006).  
Proponents have contended that neopatrimonialism distinguishes African institutions 
from others (Medard, 1982; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Englebert, 2000). Bratton and van de Walle (1997, p. 277) for example, argue that “the distinc-
tive institutional hallmark of African regimes is neopatrimonialism”. Opponents have however 
cautioned against such tendency of “overgeneralization about Africa” (Degrassi, 2008, p. 110). 
Sensitized by such positions, this study does not seek to ascribe neopatrimonialism to African 
states or developing countries as an intrinsic feature. Rather, it is posited that as in the case of 
Ghana, several characteristics of the bureaucracy are consistent with neopatrimonialism and 
rent seeking models—and that these define an institutional logic that helps explain ‘irrationali-
ties’ in TradeNet rationalization. Such characteristics of neopatrimonial states include system-
atic concentration of power, personalization of official resources, corruption and rent seeking 
(Mbaku, 1996, 1998; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, 63-65; Kelsall, 2011, 2012).  
                                                     
1 ISO 9000 is a management standard that prescribes quality guidelines to increase business efficiency and cus-
tomer satisfaction. It aims to embed a managerial quality system within an organization, increase productivity, 
reduce costs, and ensure output quality.  
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Rent seeking, a related concept developed within neoclassical economic theory (e.g., 
Krueger, 1974), elaborates another important aspects of the political economy of Africa’s un-
derdevelopment (e.g., Mbaku, 1998; Herbst, 2000; Mkandawire, 2013). Rents are defined as a 
“premium above opportunity costs for a given set of resources” (Lewis, 1994, p. 440) and occur 
when non-market forces such as politics or corruption, distort mechanisms of a free market. 
Rent seeking behaviors often arise from “politically mediated opportunities for obtaining 
wealth through non-productive economic activity” (Boone, 1990, p. 427). Lewis (1994, p. 438) 
has similarly noted a “mutually reinforcing pattern of neopatrimonial governance and a rentier 
economy.” Both neopatrimonialism and rent seeking are therefore underpinned by informal 
structures where strong formal ones might exist. Boone (1994) in her study of state-business 
relations during trade liberalization reforms in two West African coastal countries similar to 
Ghana, found that “liberalization failed to suppress commercial rent seeking” and that “trade-
centered renteerism is rooted in structural features of the West African economies. Kellsall 
(2011, p. 3) also observed that, “when it comes to state-business relations, there are significant 
disincentives to [...] making regulation transparent [...] because markets in most African coun-
tries are poorly developed political power is often the easiest route to wealth.” 
Regarding the link between rent seeking and bureaucratic corruption, Mbaku (1998, p. 
209) argues that developing countries are “characterized by weak, inefficient and nonviable 
constitutional rules and economies” and hence, “civil servants [...] are able to extort bribes from 
entrepreneurs seeking favors.” Bureaucratic corruption, in this view, is “primarily rent-seeking 
behavior and is directly related to government intervention in private exchange.” For example, 
corruption remained a topical issue in Ghana and most Ghanaians perceived their government 
and bureaucrats as corrupt (Afrobarometer, 2014). The issue of corruption at customs was in-
directly explored in our research through interview accounts of customs declarants and informal 
discussions with bureaucrats. Corruption was found to involve both formal, state-sanctioned 
practices and informal personal practices such as bribery, extortion or pilfering by some bu-
reaucrats.  
In the formal sense, a consequence of several GoG agencies mandated in customs clear-
ance by law was that such agencies charged rents like ‘inspection fees’ or ‘levies’ autonomously 
and without coordination. The Ghana Museums and Monuments Board (GMMB) for example, 
were to charge handicraft exporters 50 Ghana pesewas per item,2 to issue supporting documents 
to an IDF.3 Such practices caused tensions between traders who felt extorted from, and bureau-
crats who failed to acknowledge that their various ‘small fees’ created additional hidden costs 
(we witnessed feuding between traders and bureaucrats at a TradeNet workshop). GoG-sanc-
tioned rent-seeking did not only have historical roots,4 but were also attributable to perennial 
budget deficits and generally poor public finance which meant that under-funded GoG agencies 
                                                     
2 50 pesewas, or about 13 US cents as of October 2015. E.g., a cargo container with 1000 woodcarvings would 
cost an exporter 1000*0.13, or $130 for ‘inspection fees’ to one of several agencies in charge of regulating 
woodcarvings. These payments were not ‘official’, meaning while legal, they were not part of the payments col-
lected by GCD into national treasury. 
3 In the example of GMMB, the document was to confirm that inspected export-bound items were not antiques 
of national significance. Handicraft exporters interviewed complained they did not need such inspection because 
they dealt in new decorative artefacts with no antique value. 
4 African states, through their customs administrations historically collect between 20 to 60 per cent of national 
revenues in the form of trade-related duties, levies and taxes (Cantens, 2012, p. 1). Ghana’s 2011 figure was 
nearly 40 per cent, roughly the same as all direct domestic tax receipts to the state (Bank of Ghana, 2012, p. 3). 
Aside that, the customs administration in Ghana has been a primary instrument of state revenue collection since 
colonial times (see e.g., Chalfin, 2010). 
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were pressured to generate external funds. The theoretical constructs presented in sections 2.1 
- 2.3 are briefly summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Overview of Theoretical Constructs 
 Institutional logic Instantiations/ example of institutional logics 
Managerial rationalism  Neopatrimonial rent 
seeking logic 
Opera-
tional def-
inition 
The socially constructed, 
historical patterns of ma-
terial practices, assump-
tions, values, beliefs, and 
rules by which individu-
als produce and repro-
duce their material sub-
sistence, organize time 
and space, and provide 
meaning to their social re-
ality (Thornton and 
Ocasio, 1999, p. 804) 
Administrative logic based 
on business-like or ‘mana-
gerial’ principles such as 
efficiency, effectiveness, 
accountability etc. 
Administrative logic 
based on private misuse 
or abuse of public office 
for personal benefit e.g. 
through rents that arise 
from “politically medi-
ated opportunities for 
obtaining wealth 
through non-productive 
economic activity” 
(Boone, 1990, p. 427) 
Applica-
ble do-
main 
Most organizations have 
multiple and/or dominant 
logics 
‘New’ IT interventions and 
administrative reform para-
digms such as NPM meant 
to reform ‘old’ public ad-
ministration (bureaucracy) 
Public administrations 
(bureaucracies), espe-
cially in developing 
countries like those in 
Africa with weak for-
mal state institutions 
and strong informal ar-
rangements. 
Signifi-
cance 
Stresses that humans are 
not nonrational recipients 
and performers of taken-
for-granted institutional 
scripts but act with ration-
ality embedded in an in-
stitutional context. Insti-
tutional logics influence 
mindful, rational behav-
ior of individual actors in 
an organization who in 
turn shape institutional 
logics (Thornton, 2004) 
Since the 1980s, when 
NPM began to take hold in 
many developed countries, 
mimetic, coercive and nor-
mative pressures from in-
ternational development 
agencies and others have 
mounted on developing 
countries to similarly em-
phasize managerial ration-
ales leading to a kind of 
global institutional isomor-
phism (Powell and DiMag-
gio, 1991) 
Articulates how dys-
functional administra-
tion practices like rent 
seeking and corrup-
tion—typical in devel-
oping countries, though 
not exclusive to them—
emanate from or are re-
lated to the ‘hybrid’ for-
mal (bureaucratic)/in-
formal (traditional/pat-
rimonial) institutional 
arrangements. 
Key ac-
tors/ 
champi-
ons/ asso-
ciated 
 mostly 
with 
 “Saints” -powerful elites 
who champion reforms 
(Peterson, 1998, 44-47) 
e.g. International organiza-
tions such as World Bank, 
state agents such as ‘re-
“Demons” -people who 
undermine an infor-
mation system reform 
(Peterson, 1998, 47-50) 
e.g. Public officials (bu-
reaucrats) often re-
sistant to change and 
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formist’ government offi-
cials; “Wizards” -technical 
experts who advocate for 
technology (Peterson, 
1998, 50-52) e.g. IT staff 
adept at ‘traditional’ 
practices even if riddled 
with dysfunctionalities.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To understand how and why of ‘irrationalities’ occurred in IT-enabled rationalization in a de-
veloping country bureaucracy, case study approach was deemed appropriate (Yin, 2009). The 
study was interpretive and sensitized by theoretical concerns from extant literature (Walsham, 
2006). The case of Ghana’s TradeNet-enabled customs clearance rationalization was chosen 
because it is neither a straightforward success nor failure. Although TradeNet had a noticeable 
impact on certain performance indicators and has been widely cited as successful IT rationali-
zation (De Wulf, 2005; World Bank Group, 2010; Asuliwonno, 2011; Adaba and Rusu, 2014), 
it has not achieved its design and implementation goal as a ‘single window’ platform. 
The research relied on several data sources with constant interplay between data and 
sensitizing theoretical constructs. Primary data was collected over an intensive three-month pe-
riod spent mainly within GCD’s field office at Ghana’s main port, Tema Harbor. It consisted 
chiefly of open-ended formal and informal interviews with 65 informants in total, comprising 
street-level bureaucrats, senior officers, customs declarants (freight forwarders, importers, ex-
porters) and others involved in customs clearance and Ghana’s trade sector generally. Addi-
tional data analysed were field notes and memos from participant observations of the trading 
operations of exporters, importers, freight forwarders and clearing agents; transcriptions from 
TradeNet workshops; systems demonstrations and observations of TradeNet use, trade pro-
cessing and port operations at Tema Harbor; archival data in the form of reports, filed docu-
ments, website contents, project documents and artifacts; newspaper clippings and other records 
from credible public sources.  
The interviews aimed at understanding the nature and justifications for informants’ cus-
toms clearance practices and everyday use of TradeNet. Attention was paid to capturing a host 
of “voices” pertinent to the phenomenon (Myers and Newman, 2007) while probing tensions, 
inconsistencies and ‘irrationalities’ that emerged (Avgerou, 2000). Interviews were concluded 
when it became apparent that theoretical saturation had been reached and no additional insights 
were being identified (Eisenhardt, 1989). Informants were chosen through combination of pur-
posive and snow-balling techniques (Bryman, 2001). For example, at the onset of data collec-
tion, while interviewing a key informant at the Ghana Export Promotion Authority (GEPA) for 
background on Ghana’s exports and TradeNet, the informant invited me, impromptu, to attend 
an ongoing workshop to brief exporters on TradeNet. The workshop quickly devolved into a 
protracted feud between the exporters—mostly small business owners struggling within the 
country’s ailing economy—and organizers, over what the exporters perceived as “extortionate 
fees” pushed on them through TradeNet. It was at this chance workshop that the institutional 
contradictions of Ghana’s TradeNet first came to my attention. It was also at this workshop that 
I met (and later interviewed) several key informants who referred me to other well-placed in-
formants.  
Most interviews were audio recorded, transcribed and analyzed—during and after the 
data collection phase—for themes, patterns and processes (Yin, 2013), with aid of qualitative 
analysis software (Atlas.ti). Despite assurances, few respondents were reluctant to be recorded; 
and in such cases, I took detailed notes. The duration of interviews varied from thirty minutes 
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to three hours. Following the methodological suggestions of Robey and Boudreau (1999), anal-
ysis focused on discrepancies evident in data both during and after collection; in our specific 
case such discrepancies related to perceived ‘anomalies’ or ‘irrationalities’. Interview data was 
analysed with three broad objectives in mind (Oates, 2005): to provide directly relevant insight 
into the phenomenon of study; to build a rich description of the research phenomenon and its 
organizational and historical context; and to explore alternative understandings, issues and 
questions beyond what is directly elicited through the sensitizing theoretical framework.  
 
4. CASE STUDY 
4.1 Background 
In the 1990’s the government of Ghana (GoG) undertook trade policy reforms as part of neolib-
eral economic policies that the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
championed during structural adjustments in many developing countries (see e.g., Kraus, 1991). 
Because of Ghana’s strategic geography and seaport access, GoG and its donors were guided 
by a vision to ‘open up’ Ghana to the rest of the world by supporting export and enterprise 
development to boost private sector competitiveness and attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI). But a decade after structural adjustments, intended outcomes had failed to reach desira-
ble levels. Hence, after policy reviews, Ghana’s donors, chiefly WB, recommended a series of 
additional measures intended to eliminate constraints to trade and investments (De Wulf, 2005). 
Core to these measures were reforms of GoG ‘front line’ agencies involved in trade and invest-
ment such as the Customs Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS).5  
To that end, GoG and WB, implemented the Ghana Trade and Investment Gateway 
(GHATIG) project, a reform program that ran from 1999-2005 then extended until 2009. 
GHATIG’s goal was to make Ghana a ‘Gateway to West Africa’ and to “attract a critical mass 
of Export oriented FDI into Ghana to accelerate export-led Growth of the National Economy” 
(The World Bank Group, 2010, p. 50). GHATIG, it was hoped, would not only improve com-
petitiveness of local private enterprises but also make Ghana the most competitive investment 
destination among its peers in the West African sub-region. These objectives were in line with 
GoG’s neoliberal developmental agenda to become a middle-income country by 2020 through 
its Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) that called for the country to develop "competitive ad-
vantages", cater to export markets and to make the private sector an ‘engine of growth’ (World 
Bank Group, 2010, 9-10).  
Trade facilitation was central to GHATIG, and automating and integrating customs 
clearance became an important agenda. After a GoG delegation had visited countries with good 
trade facilitation programs, e.g. New Zealand, Singapore, Mauritius, and Malaysia, the Singa-
pore and Mauritius models were deemed most desirable. These two models indicated that aside 
benefits of speeding up trade flows; there was great potential for government revenue mobili-
zation. For example, Mauritius had become a leading textile and garment exporter partly be-
cause of technology deployed to facilitate trade, whereas Singapore’s TradeNet, developed at a 
cost of about USD 11 million in 1987, eventually saved around USD 1 billion per year in 
productivity (Yasui and Engman, 2005, p. 16). Consequently, GoG selected Crimsonlogic, a 
Singaporean company that developed Singapore’s TradeNet and transferred the technology to 
Mauritius, to provide a similar system for Ghana. By 2003, TradeNet began fully operating at 
Ghana’s main seaport, Tema Harbor, and subsequently at all ports in the country.  
                                                     
5 CEPS was later renamed Ghana Customs Division (GCD) after organizational reforms in 2004 that combined it with three 
other major revenue agencies to form the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA). The renaming was in part to signal a shift from 
CEPS’ original core enforcement functions to a more service oriented modern organization. 
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4.2 TradeNet Postimplementation  
TradeNet was designed to enable processing of customs clearance documents, duties, taxes and 
data on Ghana's imports and exports. It also allowed centralization of steps in the import and 
exports clearance process and served a dual purpose of facilitating trade and supporting GOG’s 
revenue mobilization. As a business-to-government (B2G) platform, it was meant to integrate 
several public and private actors in the trading community such as the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MOFEP), Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI), banks, over twenty 
GoG regulatory agencies, shippers, freight forwarders, etc.  
Prior to TradeNet, customs clearance and data flow between members of the trading 
community was convoluted and involved duplications and inefficiencies. Such processes were 
mostly paper based, labor intensive, time consuming, costly and error-prone, requiring multiple 
transcription and data entries. For consignments to be cleared, between 13-30 steps had to be 
completed over several weeks, depending on the nature of goods.6 Trade data were also manu-
ally compiled from paper records, thereby causing delays, inaccuracies and costs. These ineffi-
ciencies created opportunities for bureaucrats to command ‘facilitation fees’ (bribes) to ‘speed 
up’ for anxious declarants, e.g. by allowing queue jumping or manipulating the process alto-
gether. GoG annually suffered revenue losses because the system's inefficiencies enabled pri-
vate profiteering by creating an informal, intransparent facilitation economy (demand and sup-
ply for efficient service). Thus, customs, for several years, had been counted among the most 
corrupt bureaucracies in Ghana (see e.g, SOAS, 2001). 
TradeNet integration and automation which was carried out under an ‘organizing vision’ 
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) referred to as a ‘single window’ and was meant to reduce trans-
action costs for declarants, make GoG’s regulatory operations effective and efficient and to 
enhance revenues. For example, declarants were to electronically submit one online document, 
the IDF, to fulfil all regulatory, taxation, exemptions, permit and other requirements. In reality 
however, ten years after implementation, the 'single window' vision was not fully realized. The 
next two sections present two TradeNet-enabled practices meant to illustrate mixed outcomes 
of IT toward the two broad objectives of Ghana's customs clearance reforms, trade facilitation 
and revenue mobilization.7 The first practice, IDF processing, illustrates ‘irrational’ outcome 
and the second, risk controls, an outcome consistent with rationalization goals of IT. 
                                                     
6 GCNET, the public-private administering company of TradeNet reports that after TradeNet implementation, 75% of clear-
ance at Tema port now takes 1-5 days with only 11% taking more than 5 days 
7 Given constraints of this article, only two customs clearance practices from the case study are illustrated. In re-
ality, customs clearance process is highly complex and involves several specific 'customs regimes' with varying 
practices  
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4.3 TradeNet Implication in Trade Facilitation: IDF Processing 
The customs clearance process involved the following simplified steps:8 (1) A declarant com-
pleted the IDF online via the TradeNet interface (2) GCD through its outsourced private agents, 
the destination inspection companies (DICs) classified and valued the goods, assessed applica-
ble duties and taxes and issued a final valuation and classification report (FCVR) electronically 
(3) Declarant paid applicable duties and taxes at bank and physically submitted payment re-
ceipts, along with paper copies of IDF and supporting documents to customs (4) Customs bu-
reaucrats undertook compliance steps that included paper document verification (5) If docu-
ments were approved, notification was relayed electronically to declarant via TradeNet and the 
declarant was sent for a physical inspection of the goods to fulfil security, compliance and reg-
ulatory requirements before final clearance (5b) Declarant undergoes physical checks by port 
guards and other GoG agents before exiting the port. As described, important steps remained 
paper-based, requiring declarants to print out the electronic IDF and present to bureaucrats face-
to-face. This was despite TradeNet’s affordance to fully automate and integrate IDF processing 
into a single electronic step for declarants.  
The resulting mode of IDF processing at GCD may be viewed as a compromise between 
the 'single window' organizing vision of TradeNet and pre-TradeNet manual clearance proce-
dures that took place in the ‘long room’. Prior to IT automation at GCD, the 'long room' was 
where customs clearance was mostly carried out. ‘Long room’ is an elongated hallway where 
bureaucrats sat behind a row of adjoining glass-front partitions (multi-windows) to interact with 
and assist declarants to process declarations. The overall process was tightly coupled, with each 
step highly dependent on the next and hence highly susceptible to the discretion of bureaucrats, 
and easily prone to errors and inefficiencies. Furthermore, at the various stages of face-to-face 
interaction, the IDF was prone to tampering and falsification to evade taxes and duties.  
Despite such known limitations of manual, paper-based steps, several bureaucrats pre-
ferred paper-based to full electronic IDF processing with TradeNet. This 'irrationality' was puz-
zling to senior customs officials who routinely encouraged officers to use TradeNet’s electronic 
IDF capabilities fully. As one administrator lamented: 
 
[Customs] officers have so much confidence in paper that even at times the re-
ceipt that has been issued [...] it is connected [to TradeNet] so once you click 
on the declaration, you will see that payment has been done. So you don’t really 
need the physical receipt for anything. But [...] they still want to see it though it 
doesn’t add anything. 
 
To be clear, some steps such as payment of duties and taxes were constrained by lack 
of supporting infrastructure like reliable third-party online payment options while steps like 
physical inspection of goods by customs bureaucrats or their proxies were mandated by law. 
But customs bureaucrats’ preference for paper documentation—when a simple IDF number 
sufficed to electronically access and process clearance documents—was puzzling and had less 
clear justifications. 
 
4.4 TradeNet Implication in 'Revenue Mobilization': Risk Controls  
One practice that was effectively rationalized through TradeNet was risk control. This refers to 
measures taken by customs to minimize “revenue risks” to GoG. “Revenue risks” was a term 
officials used to describe losses through such means as non-payment of duties and taxes or 
                                                     
8 The steps represent a standard case where no special steps apply and the IDF is approved  
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evasion via under-reporting, falsification, misclassification or undervaluation of goods, money 
laundering etc. Through aggregation of large and accurate data, as well as back-end tools for 
data analytics, monitoring, evaluation and reporting, bureaucrats were able to create dynamic 
risk profiles for declarants, spot unusual consigments, flag high-risk consignments and coordi-
nate their responses for curtailing such risks.  
Furthermore, via integration with receiving banks, TradeNet enabled real-time and pe-
riodic monitoring, reporting and reconciliation of revenues. This allowed officials to track per-
formance relative to annual targets set by the GoG and daily targets set by senior management; 
and hence, to pre-empt and rectify potential shortfalls.9 Finally, TradeNet allowed tracking of 
outstanding duties and taxes in the case of declarants with goods in bonded warehouses,10 or 
for established declarants whom, in the interest of facilitating trade, had been granted waivers 
for future payment. A hold could be automatically placed so that they were unable to clear 
additional consignments until they had settled outstanding debts. The relevance of TradeNet for 
controlling revenue risks was described by a customs officer: 
 
Now we are able to capture a lot of data for post clearance [...] Formerly, these 
bulky sheets [points to stack of papers], you can’t go through and check [...] we 
have another regime we call the permit regime, where if your documents are not 
ready, you can apply, take the goods out and when the documents are in, you 
come back to perfect the permit. When the system was not in place declarants 
could come and beg, “oh please I have some goods to clear” and the customs 
officer will tell you the amount to pay, and we [customs] also need the revenue 
so we say “ok, let me do this for you [release a consignment without full pay-
ment]. Go and pay later.” When the declarant went they did not return. Now 
[with TradeNet], if you don’t pay, the system flags it and then you cannot send 
any more declarations [...] there is no human intervention.  
 
Another senior official further discussed the value of TradeNet in risk controls as fol-
lows: 
Any information we want we get. And during facilitation, we must have a system 
to check whether we overlooked something in the pursuit of speed [...] another 
aspect is communication. So if you are a boss in your office and you chance on 
a document that has high risk, you can immediately put in a remark and whoever 
is working on it will be cautioned [...] And then we also have the bank reconcil-
iation. Before this, we did manual reconciliation [...] because banks were not 
connected, declarants took money to the banks and got receipts [...] they came 
and customs also gave them receipts. So at the end of the period, we had to 
reconcile the payment at the bank to our receipts.  
 
As illustrated, TradeNet not only reformed risk control practices, but afforded customs 
bureaucrats novel capabilities, as in the case of the permit regime, to negotiate conflicting goals 
of trade facilitation (with its need for speed) and revenue mobilization (with its need for accu-
rate data and control). 
 
                                                     
9 Meeting GoG revenue targets was the sole performance criteria for GCD and repeated failure to meet targets 
could have serious professional and organizational consequences.  
10 A bonded warehouse is a customs-secured warehouse for withholding imports until owed duty and taxes were 
paid. 
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Rather than seeing the IDF processing and risk controls examples of TradeNet outcomes as 
purely driven by individual cognition such as resistance or appropriation, or purely the result 
of structures like institutions and culture, we suggest that for ‘irrational’ outcomes as in IDF 
processing, the managerial logic of TradeNet contradicted the bureaucratic logic of neopatri-
monial rent seeking. Hence, electronic IDF processing, rather than rationalizing manual paper-
based human interventions, co-existed with it. On the other hand, for risk controls where Trad-
eNet effectively enabled rationalization there were no observed contradictions between mana-
gerial rationalism and neopatrimonial rent seeking logic. Consequently, we interpret ‘irration-
ality’—the existence of manual practices despite IT affordance for full automation and integra-
tion—as a ‘good enough’ or satisficing outcome when managerial and neopatrimonial rent 
seeking logics contradicted.  
Guided by the four aspects of institutional logics highlighted earlier—organizing prin-
ciples, causal means-ends assumptions, identity formation, and domain specificity—we elabo-
rate four implications of contradicting institutional logics in ‘irrationalities’ of IT rationaliza-
tion, as summarized in Table 1. In terms of guiding principles, the managerial principles of 
efficiency, effectiveness, control and accountability of formal processes appeared to sometimes 
contradict the principles of neopatrimonial rent seeking where formal (bureaucratic) and infor-
mal (personal) authority co-existed while their interests and values conflated. As a ‘resolution’ 
of such contradicting principles, bureaucrats tended to generally adhere to both, leading to in-
stances of ‘irrationalities’. As a senior TradeNet specialist admitted “officers are used to face 
to face contact, such that even if you send the thing [IDF] online and there is no paper, they will 
still be in the long room [expecting to see hardcopies].”  
Relatedly, the managerial causal means-ends assumption of TradeNet—that automation 
and integration leads to better outcomes for declarants—contradicted the assumptions of neo-
patrimonial rent seeking logic of customs bureaucrats that the clearance process was solely to 
generate customs revenues, and that IT’s usefulness or otherwise could be judged against this 
primary goal. This contradiction led to perceived tensions between the two design objectives of 
TradeNet—trade facilitation and revenue collections. This sentiment was captured by a senior 
customs officer who suggested that automation sometimes came at the expense of effective 
revenue collections: “during facilitation,” he explained, “we must have a system of falling back, 
to check whether we overlooked something in the pursuit of speed”.  
In addition, contradictions in neopatrimonial rent seeking logic and managerial ration-
alism manifested as inconsistency in the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ identities of bureaucrats i.e. 
how they saw themselves versus how declarants/others perceived them. For example, hierarchic 
orientation of bureaucrats contrasted with the market orientation of TradeNet managerialism; 
enforcement orientation and customs officers’ primary identity as revenue collectors was con-
trasted with the service orientation they assumed for TradeNet facilitation; revenue ‘target 
driven’ mindset of customs bureaucrats was also inconsistent with the client (declarant) focus 
of TradeNet managerialism; finally, the high sense of discretionary power that came with tra-
ditional bureaucratic logic was seen as undermined by the disintermediating effects of TradeNet 
in IDF processing. Because of such changing identities and attendant tensions, customs roles 
and practices appeared to be in flux. “For a long time we have just been working; going and 
coming [...]” a senior bureaucrat remarked in relation to her new role, “we had an idea [...] but 
it wasn’t structured. We are now coming up with a job evaluation to get an organogram.”  
Finally, as institutional logics are domain specific and multiple institutional logics might 
exist within a given organization, technology’s effectiveness in rationalizing depended on the 
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compatibility of logics. We illustrated this point with the two TradeNet related practices pre-
sented, IDF processing and risk controls. Even though bureaucrats drew upon both managerial 
rationalism and neopatrimonial rent seeking logics in their performance of both practices, Trad-
eNet encountered ‘irrationality’ and was generally less effective in IDF processing than in risk 
controls because the two logics contradicted more for IDF processing than for risk controls. 
Despite being unable to clearly explain differences in effective use of TradeNet, senior officials 
were admitting of the discrepancy, “overall, TradeNet appears to have been more effective with 
revenue mobilization [risk controls] [...] we have some way to go with facilitation [IDF pro-
cessing]” (A senior TradeNet specialist, quoted from interview transcript). 
Despite the potential of our theorizing to shed some new light on ‘irrationalities’ of IT-
enabled bureaucratic rationalization in developing countries, our approach has limitations. For 
example, while the institutional logics lens provides a useful way to theorize multiple logics 
and contradictions sometimes underpinning IT enabled bureaucratic rationalization, the condi-
tions under which such contradictions lead to ‘irrationalities’ or less-than-intended outcomes 
remains to be explored. Furthermore, the question of why neopatrimonial rent seeking logic in 
developing country bureaucracies like in Ghana ‘resists’ reform into a ‘pure’ logic of manage-
rial rationalism might similarly be probed.  
Ultimately, the tensions and contradictions that manifest as ‘irrationalities’ during IT 
enabled rationalization of developing country bureaucracies are not solely idiosyncrasies of 
individual users but might implicate broader social structures. Furthermore, bureaucrats are not 
limited to a single logic in the course of their IT-enabled practices. They draw upon different, 
sometimes contradicting logics that co-exist and reproduce in practice. In this view, ‘innova-
tive’ institutional logics such as managerial rationalism of IT may not necessarily reform ‘old’ 
logics such as neopatrimonial rent seeking, although the latter might be weakened as actors 
seek ‘good enough’ ways to satisfice both logics. This finding is consistent with Dacin and 
Dacin’s (2008, p. 327) observation that “[existing] institutionalized practices are rarely ever 
completely extinguished but continue albeit weaker in scope (extent of diffusion) or potency”. 
Our findings however differ from ‘amplification theories’ of IT and development which suggest 
that rather than enabling transformation, technology simply “magnifies” or “amplifies” existing 
human and institutional forces (Toyama, 2011a, 2011b).  
We suggest that by embodying an institutional logic of managerial rationalism, technol-
ogy might make a difference for developing countries, although not independently of other 
powerful logics such as neopatrimonialism or rent seeking. ICT4D professionals and scholars 
will do well to identify and appreciate ‘old’ existing local institutional logics and how they 
counteract (or sometimes enable) ‘new’ logics introduced by IT. Such recognition of multiple 
institutional logics within the organization and the nature of their interaction might inform bet-
ter design and implementation of ICT4D projects, motivate complementary non-ICT-related 
organizational interventions, as well as aid sensemaking of idiosyncratic ICT4D outcomes 
when even the best plans and implementations do not completely go as expected.
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Aspect of Institu-
tional Logic 
Managerial 
Rationalism of TradeNet 
Neopatrimonial 
Rent Seeking Logic of Bureaucracy 
Implication of Contradiction 
Guiding Principle Efficiency, effectiveness, control 
and accountability of formal pro-
cesses 
Informal (personal) and formal (bureaucratic) 
authority co-exist with interests and values 
conflating 
Co-existence of new TradeNet 
and old bureaucratic principles 
Representa-
tive  
quotation 
“CEPS is now ISO 9000 certified 
[...] with a new mission and vision 
[...] The system [TradeNet] has 
enabled flow of information [...] 
clearance of goods has improved 
tremendously” (World Bank 
Group, 2010, p. 29) 
“When you go to the port now somebody [bu-
reaucrat] will tell you “give me 500 cedis, 
give me 200 cedis.” I have a copy of receipts 
here I can show you [...] all these charges are 
‘unofficial’. It doesn’t make sense! And now 
that they realize we are making noise about it 
they [GMMB] are trying to put it in the Trad-
eNet and try to charge 50p per item. So if they 
are able to implement it is going to be a cost 
that will remain there that every year they will 
increase. So at the end of it they are [...] going 
to put a lot of burden on us.” (Handicraft ex-
porter, interview transcript) 
“Some officers are used to face 
to face contact, such that even if 
you send the thing online and 
there is no paper, they will still 
be in the long room”  
(Senior TradeNet specialist, in-
terview transcript) 
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Causal Means-Ends  
Assumption 
IT automation and integration 
lead to better customs clearance 
outcomes for declarants 
Customs clearance exists to mainly generate 
customs revenues. Therefore IT’s usefulness 
or otherwise judged against this goal 
Perceived tension between trade 
facilitation and revenue collec-
tions 
Representa-
tive  
quotation 
“[TradeNet] improved clearance 
dramatically, I must say. And if 
we all are interested and use it to 
the maximum, I think we will reap 
a lot of benefit” (Senior customs 
IT officer, interview transcript) 
“Our performance is measured by our ability 
to meet government revenue targets”  
(customs officer, policy and programs, inter-
view transcript) 
“And during facilitation, we 
must have a system of falling 
back, to check whether we over-
looked something in the pursuit 
of speed” (senior customs of-
ficer, interview transcript) 
Bureaucrats’ Iden-
tity 
- Market orientation of bu-
reaucrats 
- Service orientation of bu-
reaucrats 
- Client/declarant focus 
- Low sense of power be-
cause of elimination of 
personal discretion 
- Hierarchic orientation of bureaucrats 
- Enforcement orientation e.g. as reve-
nue collectors and rule enforcers 
- ‘Target driven’ mindset e.g. for reve-
nues 
- High sense of power through personal 
discretion 
Inconsistent identities of bu-
reaucrats between ‘internal’ 
(how they see their role) and 
‘external’ (how declarants/oth-
ers perceive their role) 
Representa-
tive  
quotation 
“Initially because it [TradeNet] 
was a new thing, officers didn’t 
know where they would be found 
wanting so people were kind of 
complying, but with time, I mean 
the smart ones study it and know 
where the loop holes are and do 
their own thing” (Senior customs 
officer, interview transcript) 
“[Thanks to TradeNet] Right now I can tell 
you how much revenue we have collected 
since morning up to this time. So when we 
come to the office, early in the morning, like 
7 o’clock, you have to produce your first re-
port, everyday. Revenue for the previous day, 
you submit them to the commander, and prob-
ably the commissioner will call you and then 
they will relay it to the ministry [...] we cant 
miss our target even for a single day”  
(Senior customs officer, collections, inter-
view transcript) 
“For a long time we have just 
been working; going and com-
ing [...] We had an idea [...] but 
it wasn’t structured. We are now 
coming up with a job evaluation 
to get an organogram” (senior 
officer explaining her new role 
and ongoing streamlining of 
roles, interview transcript) 
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Table 2. Contradicting institutional logics and their implications in Ghana’s TradeNet-enabled customs rationalization
Relevant practice do-
main 
IDF processing Risk controls e.g. post clearance Technology’s effectiveness in 
enabling change depended on 
the compatibility of logics irre-
spective of practice domains 
Representa-
tive  
quotation 
“We have rationalized—cut down 
the number of steps that people 
had to go through [...] but we 
could still automate more, go pa-
perless” (senior officer, interview 
transcript) 
“TradeNet has enhanced our revenue mobili-
zation capability by allowing us to do things 
that were not possible before [...] audits, con-
trols, analytics and so on” (customs officer, 
interview transcript) 
 
“Overall, TradeNet appears to 
have been more effective with 
revenue mobilization [...] we 
have some way to go with facili-
tation” (Senior TradeNet spe-
cialist, interview transcript) 
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